DOMAIN 5 · Identity and Access Management
Access Control: Policies, Permissions, and the Identity Lifecycle
Compare role and attribute based authorization, enforce least privilege, and manage permissions through organizational changes.
Separate login from permission
Section titled “Separate login from permission”Authentication provides evidence about a claimant. Authorization decides whether that subject may perform a particular operation on a particular resource. A valid session is therefore an input to an access decision, not permission to do everything. OWASP recommends least privilege, default denial, and permission checks on every request.1
For CISSP, examine both the logical rule and its administration: who approves access, how it is enforced, and what happens when employment or responsibilities change.
Compare policy models
Section titled “Compare policy models”| Model | Main basis for a decision | Design consideration |
|---|---|---|
| Role-based access control | Permissions associated with assigned roles | Roles should represent stable job functions |
| Attribute-based access control | Subject, object, operation, and relevant environment attributes | Attribute quality and policy evaluation must be controlled |
NIST defines ABAC in terms of attributes evaluated against policy. A subject’s department, a document’s classification, the requested action, and a contextual condition can contribute to one decision. Roles and attributes can coexist; using ABAC does not require abandoning every role.2
Follow a decision through enforcement
Section titled “Follow a decision through enforcement”An ABAC design needs trusted attribute sources, policy administration, a decision function, and enforcement where access actually occurs. A correct policy is ineffective if the API, file download, or alternate route can bypass it. OWASP specifically warns against relying on client-side checks and includes static resources within authorization design.21
Treat changing attributes as operational dependencies. If a contractor’s end date is wrong or a resource’s owner is missing, the access decision may be wrong even when the policy engine behaves exactly as configured. Define how missing or stale information affects permission rather than silently assuming it is trustworthy.
Worked example: a purchasing system
Section titled “Worked example: a purchasing system”In this fictional system, a purchasing role permits employees to prepare orders. A separate approval permission is limited to managers within the order’s business unit. The author of an order cannot approve the same order. These rules distinguish a general job function from transaction-specific conditions and separation of duties.
An attacker changes an order identifier in a URL. Hiding the approval button provides no protection: the server must check permission for the selected order and operation. Tests should include another unit’s order, an order created by the approver, an expired contractor account, and direct API requests. These are illustrative test cases, not a universal purchasing policy.
Manage joiners, movers, and leavers
Section titled “Manage joiners, movers, and leavers”An effective permission process begins with an approved business need. When a person changes teams, compare the new need with existing permissions instead of only adding access. When access ends, address active sessions and associated credentials as well as the account record.
Periodic reviews need a decision owner and meaningful evidence: the resource, permission, business justification, and current responsibility. A list of enabled accounts alone does not show whether their permissions are appropriate. This operational approach supports least privilege and the ongoing review of authorization described by OWASP.1
Common misunderstandings
Section titled “Common misunderstandings”- “An unpredictable identifier prevents unauthorized access.” It does not replace a resource-level permission decision.
- “ABAC is always simpler than roles.” Complex policies and unreliable attributes can make it harder to explain decisions.
- “Deleting an account removes every route of access.” Other sessions, tokens, and linked accounts may need separate handling.
- “More deny rules automatically mean better security.” The policy must remain understandable, testable, and aligned with the organization’s legitimate work.
Connect this topic
Section titled “Connect this topic”Digital identity supplies identity context. Security testing examines bypasses, while control assessment evaluates the broader evidence of appropriate authorization.
References
Section titled “References”Footnotes
Section titled “Footnotes”-
NIST, SP 800-162, Guide to Attribute Based Access Control Definition and Considerations, updated August 2019; sections 2 and 3. ↩ ↩2
Independent, unofficial study notes. Not endorsed or reviewed by ISC2. CISSP is a registered trademark of ISC2.
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